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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 9. Opportunism in Defense Contracting 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
1:45 p.m. – 
3:15 p.m. 
Chair: Dr. Fred Thompson, Professor, Atkinson Graduate School of Management, 
Willamette University 
Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public Contracts 
Marian Moszoro, IESE Business School, Barcelona 
Pablo T. Spiller, University of California, Berkeley 
Business Models for Cost Sharing and Capability Sustainment 
Michael Pryce, Manchester Business School 
Endogenous Split Awards for Protest Management 
Peter Coughlan, Naval Postgraduate School 
Fred Thompson—Dr. Thompson is the Grace and Elmer Goudy Professor of Public Management 
and Policy Analysis at the Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University. Dr. 
Thompson is a specialist in the field of tax policy and regulation. 
Dr. Thompson is co-editor of the Handbook of Public Finance. He was the founding editor of the 
International Public Management Journal and is currently associate editor of the Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis. He has been published in numerous scholarly journals, including the 
American Political Science Review, Public Administration Review, Public Choice, and Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. 
In 2000 Dr. Thompson received the Distinguished Research Award of the National Association of 
Schools of Public Affairs and Administration and the American Society for Public Administration. In 
2005 he received the Aaron B. Wildavsky Award for Outstanding Lifetime Scholarly Achievement in 
the field of public budgeting and financial management of the Association for Budgeting and Financial 
Management. In 2006 he served on the United Nations Development Program’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Macedonia. 
Dr. Thompson earned his Bachelor of Arts in economics and history from Pomona College and 
his PhD from the Center for Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University.
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=284 - 
=
Third-Party Opportunism and the (In)Efficiency of Public 
Contracts1 
Marian Moszoro—Moszoro is a professor of finance and policy and a research fellow of the Public-
Private Sector Research Center at IESE Business School in Barcelona, Spain. Professor Moszoro 
holds a PhD in economics from the Warsaw School of Economics in Poland. In 2005–2006, he was 
Undersecretary of State and Deputy Minister of Finance of Poland. 
Pablo T. Spiller—Spiller is a Jeffrey A. Jacobs Distinguished Professor of business and technology 
at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, CA. He is a visiting professor of 
law at Columbia University, and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Professor Spiller earned his PhD in economics from the University of Chicago. 
Abstract 
The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation is a political risk 
adaptation by which public agents limit hazards from opportunistic third parties—political 
opponents, competitors, and interest groups—and externalize the associated adaptation 
costs to the public at large. Public agents endogenize the likelihood of opportunistic 
challenge, lowering third parties’ expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a 
comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions: Scrutiny 
increases public contracting efficiency in costly litigation environments, concentrated 
(politically) contestable markets, and with upwardly biased beliefs about benefits of 
challenge. 
Executive Summary2 
In contrast to private contracts, public contracts are open to challenge by third 
parties. The whiff of corruption and the concern for misuse of other people’s monies make 
challenging public contracts feasible. Even though the enactment and performance of a 
contract may be honest and legal, public agents may fear politically motivated challenges, 
and hence will ex ante adjust the nature of the contracts so as to limit those features whose 
probity may be questioned. These adjustments imply more contract specificity in design and 
rigidity in implementation. Such contractual adaptation, however, is not costless. 
Contractors’ perception of specificity and rigidity translates into ex ante higher prices, as well 
as the enactment of stronger compensating clauses. The contractual complexity and 
adaptation required to limit the potential for third-party challenges, whether opportunistic or 
not, make public contracting look “inefficient.” 
The higher level of contract specificity and rigidity in public contracting can be 
understood, then, as a political risk adaptation by public agents. It is not that civic-oriented 
legislation limits public agents’ discretionary actions with “red tape,” but rather that public 
agents limit the risk of third parties’ challenges through contract formalities and rigidities, 
externalizing the associated costs to the public at large. 
This paper provides an operationalization of Spiller’s (2008) third-party opportunism 
(TPO) towards an understanding of the organizational foundations of pricing, specificity, and 
rigidity—the outer features—of public contracts. Spiller’s theory of public organization is 
rooted in a transaction cost-cum-positive political theory, where the nature of the 
organizational adaptation of public contracts results from their inherent hazards. Spiller’s 
framework follows Williamson’s (1999) four cornerstones of the economics of governance—
namely, governance, transaction costs, adaptation, and interdisciplinary social science—and 
introduces third-party opportunism as the quintessential hazard of public transactions. 
                                                
1 JEL Classification: D23, D72, D73, D78, H57. 
2 Full paper downloadable at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969105 
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Prior Literature 
Third-party opportunism relates to a threefold literature on public contracting: 
industrial organization, public administration, and political economy. 
In the industrial organization literature, public-contract pricing is fundamentally 
determined by informational costs arising from informational asymmetries, the extent of 
verifiability of information, and the presence of repeated interactions (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; 
Laffont & Tirole, 1993; Loeb & Surysekar, 1994; Macaulay, 1963). It is, however, the nature 
of the hazards involved in public-private relations that determines the fundamental features 
of public procurement and contracting. Not only is “the nature of the agreement . . . carefully 
delimited, and the more formal features govern when . . . terms are contested,” but the 
potential for a contest from an excluded seller is what impacts the nature of the agreement 
(Marshall, Meurer, & Richard 1994a). 
Whereas the parties in private-private relations adapt to new information as it 
becomes available in order to save litigation costs, and courts are used rather to terminate 
disputes, public contracts appear bureaucratic and over-monitoring in situations in which it is 
not needed (Prendergast, 2003, pp. 932–933). According to the public administration view, 
contracting inefficiencies are associated with the large number of formal processes that 
appear to be essential to ensure the public sector’s functions, as well as with “red tape,” that 
is, costly and compulsory rules, regulations, and procedures with no efficacy for their 
functional object (Bozeman, 1993, p. 274). Bureaucrats are used only for “hard” agency 
problems, where consumers cannot be trusted (Prendergast, 2003, p. 933). Extensive rules 
and regulations arise from dividing authority among the separate branches of government 
(executive, legislative, and judicial), which were designed to prevent abuses of power, 
protect people’s rights (Baldwin, 1990, pp. 10–11), and reflect equity values not necessarily 
present in private firms, including educational, health-related, legal, and environmental 
values (Forrer et al., 2010, p. 480). Red tape regulations are intended to decrease public 
employees’ uncertainty about how they should behave (Kurland & Egan, 1999, p. 440). Both 
formalities and red tape are the instruments by which bureaucracies restrict public agents’ 
discretion (Boyne, 2002; Lan & Rainey, 1992) and “overcome the temptation to capitulate to 
consumers simply to avoid complaints” (Prendergast, 2003, p. 932). 
The political economy profession has long been divided into advocates of public 
interest theory (in line with the public sector motivation literature) and “capture” or interest 
group theory of government intervention in industries, seeded by Buchanan (1965) and 
Olson (1965) and elaborated by Stigler (1971). This positive approach, both in its Chicago 
school (Becker, 1983; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971) and Virginia school (Buchanan, 1975; 
Buchanan, Tollison, & Tullock, 1980) modalities, concentrates on the demand-side, “black-
boxing” the supply-side of political decision-making (Laffont & Tirole, 1993, pp. 475–476). 
On the other hand, positive political theory scholars, led by Riker (1963), focused on the 
supply-side of political decision-making, studying how politics/legislative procedures, 
administrative procedures, and bureaucratic oversight affects legislative, judicial, and 
regulatory behavior. Positive political scholars have also studied the use of interested parties 
(McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; de Figueiredo, Spiller, & Urbiztondo, 1999) and consumers 
(Prendergast, 2003) as instruments of oversight. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) emphasized that the link  
between procurement and regulation and the associated administrative and 
political constraints is still unknown to us or is still in a state of conjecture. . . . 
Institutions are endogenous and should as much as possible be explained by 
primitive considerations. 
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This paper is an attempt to rationalize the basic features of public contracting from its 
primitive considerations: its fundamental hazards. 
A Model of Third-Party Opportunism 
Signaling Process: Hazards into Rigidity 
We focus our analysis on the public agent’s perspective. Furthermore, we ignore 
sunk costs to abstract from governmental opportunism and to make the argument on TPO 
straightforward. 
There are four agents explicitly and implicitly involved in public contracting: 
1. the incumbent public agent; 
2. the private contractor; 
3. third-party challengers (i.e., political opponents to the incumbent public agent, 
competitors to the contractor, and interest groups); and 
4. the public at large (i.e., voters and courts). 
The signaling process starts before the contract is signed. The public agent receives 
project features and the budget to contract for goods and services. The public agent 
perceives the threat of potential third-party challenges and tries to minimize political risks 
and maintain political support. The private contractor may not be directly aware of the 
hazards faced by the public agent but observes contract specificity and rigidity. Specificity 
and rigidity equal less adaptability, higher contracting and implementation costs, and hence 
higher final prices charged to the public agent. Third parties privately perceive the benefits 
from challenge. Contract features affect third parties’ strategies, thereby affecting political 
outcomes. If a public contract does not meet the public’s expectations, political 
consequences may include weakened chances of re-election for incumbent public agents 
(Forrer et al., 2010, p. 480). 
Conceptualizing Contract Specificity and Rigidity 
Contract specificity refers to ex ante complexity of subject, completeness of clauses, 
technical provisions, and processing costs (Laffont & Tirole, 1993, p. 307). Contract rigidity 
refers to ex post enforcement, penalties, hardness, and intolerance to adaptation of 
contracts, and normally correlates with contract specificity: The more specific the contract is, 
the more rigid its implementation and enforcement is expected to be. Otherwise, if the 
contract is specific and then the parties agree to deviate, third parties can accuse the 
contracting parties of collusion. 
Complex public contracts have more contractual rigidities than simpler contracts. The 
cost of ex post enforcement increases in complexity. Because the public sector has more 
ambiguous objectives than private organizations (Boyne, 2002), and because it is difficult to 
assess to what extent these objectives are achieved (Lan & Rainey, 1992), public high 
specificity and rigidity mitigate ambiguity and problematic evaluation. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Defense directives specify in great detail source selection policies, including 
the development of objective technical, cost, schedule, manufacturing, performance, risk 
criteria, auction techniques, the organization of the selection committee, and the pertinence 
of contacts with contractors. Public agents must also follow imposed standards of evidence 
and may be constrained to formulate standards and follow their own rules to avoid 
discriminating between distinct situations on the basis of non-verifiable information (Laffont 
& Tirole, 1993, p. 5). 
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Concluding Remarks 
TPO theory combines political hazards and transaction costs to explain apparent 
inefficiencies in public contracts. High ex ante payment volatility or ex post exibility in 
implementation may trigger drawbacks, leading to contract failure or costly adaptation by the 
public official, whether in terms of time or political career. A paramount conclusion of our 
analysis is that public contracts cannot be directly compared to private contracts. Instead, 
they can be compared only to analogous public contracts and should pass Williamson’s 
(1999) “remediableness criterion,” which holds that “an extant mode of organization for 
which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net 
gains is presumed to be efficient” (p. 316) to attest to their efficiency. 
The fact that public contracting is more expensive and rigid than private contracting, 
however, does not mean that transferring those activities to the public sector would reduce 
political risks and hence make them more efficient. Public procurement is used for “hard” 
agency problems where consumers cannot be trusted and “when bureaucracies work 
poorly, [but] consumer choice works worse” (Prendergast, 2003, pp. 930–933). Not only, as 
Williamson (1999, p. 320) discusses, do certain transactions have special needs for probity 
and require the security of the State, but the privatization of public functions itself involves 
TPO hazards, making them less preferable for public agents than public contracting itself. 
In this paper, we analyzed public procurement in a variety of environments to show 
that much of its outer features can be understood as political adaptations to the fundamental 
hazard of third-party opportunism prevalent in public contracting.
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